In this paper, we reexamine Bruno Marchal’s *Movie Graph
Argument*, which demonstrates a basic incompatibility between

computationalism and materialism. We discover that the incompatibility

is only manifest in singular classical-like universes. If we accept

that we live in a Multiverse, then the incompatibility goes away, but

in that case another line of argument shows that with

computationalism, fundamental, or primitive materiality has no causal

influence on what is observed, which must must be derivable from basic

arithmetic properties.

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Your “state of the art” is a very nice introduction to the MGA and Maudlin’s argument. Very clear and concise, helped me organize my thoughts on these.

I am not convinced that the MWI + the anthropic principle is equivalent to the subset of the universal dovetailer computations that supports all possible human experiences. I am also not convinced that the set of all possible human experiences is finite. Russell, could you elaborate on these?

Hi Telmo, I only just noticed your comment. I think I had comment notifications turned off because I was getting too much spam, but I’ve turned it back on again now, so hopefully a discussion will ensue.

The MWI is capable of instantiating all possible computations, each in its own universe, since all solutions to Schroedinger’s equation is realised.

If COMP is accepted, then anthropic selection on the MWI will select out the subset of the UD* supporting all possible human experiences.

Did I say the set of all possible human experiences is finite? I believe the opposite to be true, that there is a countable infinity of experiences in fact, but perhaps in the context of finitisim or some other assumption, the set will be finite. Could you tell me the context?